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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tial damages limits the compensatory function of a defamation action
since direct proof of specific injury caused by defamation is often
difficult if not impossible.3
By the very nature of the harm resulting from defamatory publi-
cations, it is frequently not susceptible of objective proof. Libel
and slander work their evil in ways that are invidious and subtle.
The door of opportunity may be closed to the victim without his
knowledge, his business or professional career limited by the
operation of forces which he cannot identify but which, nonethe-
less, were set in motion by the defamatory statements.30
In light of these considerations-an uncertain and perhaps un-
necessary method of regulating jury determinations, the questionable
vindicatory value of a judicial verdict without damages, and the
inherent difficulty of the proof required-it seems more desirable
to permit the award of substantial compensation for defamatory
harm based on a presumption of damages. Maintenance of the full
scope of this presumption, coupled with more thorough instructions
to juries and a greater readiness to review their damages awards,
is a preferable alternative to the requirement of direct proof of dam-
age to qualify for substantial award-which seems to be the most
probable effect of Bouligny. This alternative permits compensation
for unprovable but present harm, and also offers greater protection
from unreasonable damages awards.
Finally, it must be admitted that it remains basically unclear
exactly what the Bouligny dictum intends to require of a plaintiff
seeking compensation for damages resulting from actionable per se
defamation. This added uncertainty as to what he must do to gain
substantial compensation for defamatory harm should be clarified
at the court's earliest opportunity.
RICHARD W. ELLIS
Estate Tax-Deductions-Life Beneficiary with Power to
Invade Corpus of Charitable Remainder
The Internal Revenue code of 1954 provides that in the deter-
mination of the taxable estate the value of all transfers, bequest,
legacies, or devises of property to certain public, charitable, or
" Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 660 (D.C. Cir.
1966); RESTATEMiENT OF ToRTs § 621, comment a (1938).
"1 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, THE LAW OF ToRTs 468 (1956).
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religious organizations is to be deducted from the value of the
gross estate.' By allowing the deduction congress hoped to shift
to the private sector charitable expenditures it would probably other-
wise have to assume. The theory seems to be that the private sec-
tor can maintain the charitable programs more economically, ef-
ficiently, and with less political interference than either federal or
state government. Realizing the possibilities created for obtaining
funds, the charitable organizations have undertaken extensive
campaigns for contributions; and the response has been good since
there are tax advantages in charitable giving for both the wealthy
and those with more moderate means.2
A frequently used method of giving entails the establishment of
a trust directing the trustee to pay the income to a private lifetime
beneficiary with the remainder over to charity. The trustee is also
given the power to invade the corpus of the trust in favor of the
lifetime beneficiary. By using this method the testator hopes to
insure the comfort and happiness of the private beneficiary and at
the same time obtain a charitable deduction. In the absence of a
power to invade, the amount of the deduction can be easily de-
termined." But where such a power exists a considerable amount
of controversy has developed over what circumstances should exist
before a deduction is allowed. The source of this controversy is
the uncertainty as to the value of the interest charity will ultimately
receive. The Treasury Department has taken the position that a
deduction is allowable; but, to insure that charity will take an
amount commensurate to the deduction allowed, the Treasury
requires that the value of the remainder interest be "presently
ascertainable and, hence severable from the private interest"4 and
that the possibility of an invasion be "so remote as to be negligi-
ble."5  These requirements may seem to present few complexities
' NT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2055.
' See generally, Lowndes, Tax Advantages of Charitable Giving, 46 VA.
L. REv. 394 (1960); Merritt, .Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving, 36
TAxEs 646 (1958); Yohlin, Tax Blessings of Charitable Giving, 10 PRAc.
LAW 43 (May 1964); Young, Tax Effects of Gifts to Charity, 41 TAxEs
351 (1963).
' Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(A) (1958). This section allows a deduction for
the present value of the remainder interest created when property is placed
in a trust to pay the income to a private lifetime beneficiary and then to
pay the principal to charity. The remainder interest is valued according
to the rules stated in § 20.2032-7.
'Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(A) (1958).
'Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(B) (1958).
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but in their application the courts have been faced with three major
questions: In what order should the tests be applied? What does
"presently ascertainable" mean? And what is "so remote as to be
negligible?"
To obtain a deduction the burden is on the taxpayer to show
that the necessary requirements have been met.6 First, he must prove
that the power of invasion is limited by a "presently ascertainable"
standard. Without such a standard no deduction is allowed.7
If such a standard is found, he must then prove that the possibility
of an invasion is negligible; but where no standard exists the courts
refuse to consider this problem." In those cases where there is a
standard but the possibility of invasion is more than remote the
courts must decide what amount of the claimed deduction is to be
denied.
In Moffet v. Commissioner' the Fourth Circuit denied the entire
deduction when it found that the possibility of invasion was not "so
remote as to be negligible." In that case the testator established a
million and a half dollar trust from which yearly payments were to
be made to his widow for life. Charity was to receive the re-
mainder. In denying the deduction the court was unimpressed by
the taxpayer's argument that a deduction should be allowed for
the present value of the charitable remainder computed after
subtracting from the original trust corpus an amount determined
by the multiplication of the expected annual invasion by the widow's
life expectancy. This decision was clearly repudiated by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Schildkraut v. Commissioner.1" There, on substan-
tially the same facts, a partial deduction was allowed. The court
held that the requirement that the possibility of invasion be negli-
gible did not apply in this context. It felt that the proper test was
whether there is an interest that is "presently ascertainable" and
"assurance" that charity will ultimately receive it. In short, the
court took the position of the Treasury Department in Revenue
'Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.
1950); Commerce Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. Mo.
1958).
'Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929).8 Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595
(1949); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943);
Salisbury v. United States, 377 F.2d 700 (2nd Cir. 1967); Merrill Trust
Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 474 (D. Me. 1958).
'269 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1959).
" 368 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1967).
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Ruling 54-285" that "if the facts indicate the probability of an in-
vasion to a limited extent which is calculable in accordance with an
ascertainable standard, the deduction should be denied only to such
extent." From these two cases it is clear that there is a serious dis-
pute as to whether a negligible possibility of invasion is a prerequi-
site for any deduction. In the light of this dispute it would be ad-
visable for the testator to utilize some other tax saving method
where it appears that even a limited invasion is probable. The sim-
plest solution would be an outright devise by the testator, after con-
sultation with an attorney, to the widow and charity of interests
approximately equal in value to those they would have taken under
the trust.
There has been some criticism of the requirement that a
"presently ascertainable" standard must exist within the will before
a deduction is allowed. Those who criticize are in effect rejecting
the "two-step" analysis. In a dissent in Merchants National Bank
v. Commissioner2 Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice
Jackson concurred, argued that in determining whether the stan-
dard was ascertainable the court should consider such outside fac-
tors as the frugality and conservatism of the trustee, the habits
of the beneficiary, and the nature of the investments. These
factors might make certain what on the face of the will appears
uncertain; thus, the likelihood of. invasion should be the de-
termining factor. By using this test it is felt that the congressional
policy of favoring charity would be better served. In support
of this argument cases can be cited where the charitable deduction
was denied even though the facts showed that, as a matter of
common experience, the charitable beneficiary was as assured
of receiving the corpus intact as in other cases where an ascertain-
able standard was found and a deduction allowed.' 3 This incon-
sistency seems to be the basis for most objections to the present
"two-step" test.
In answer to these criticisms the Court has said that "[w]hat
common experience may regard as remote in the generality of cases
11 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 302.
12320 U.S. 256 (1943).
18 Compare Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943),
Gammons v. Hassett, 121 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
673 (1941), and Merrill Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 474 (D.
Me. 1958), with Estate of Mary C. Wood, 39 T.C. 919 (1963) and Estate
of Leonard 0. Carlson, 21 T.C. 291 (1963).
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may nonetheless be beyond the realm of precise prediction in the
single instance."' 4 In sum, the Court was pointing to the additional
uncertainty created by the absence of a "presently ascertainable"
standard. Whether or not a standard exists would in itself be an
important factor in determining the likelihood of an invasion.
Without a limiting standard the courts can only speculate as to the
needs or desires of the lifetime beneficiary. Of course the courts
can look to the beneficiary's past station in life and draw some con-
clusions as to his frugality but in light of the general uncertainty
surrounding human affairs no adequate projection can be made.
In fact, without first establishing a standard it is difficult to see
how the likelihood of an invasion can be determined. Furthermore
it must be remembered that the tax is imposed on the transfer of
property or the act of the testator 5 and that when he creates a
trust giving charity a vested interest subject to divestment for the
benefit of the private beneficiary he is only secondarily concerned
with the charitable beneficiary. When this intent is considered in
conjunction with the broad power of invasion given the trustee it
does not seem unfair to deny the deduction.
What language constitutes an "ascertainable standard?" In
answer to this question the Court has said that the purposes for
which the corpus may be invaded must be subject to "reliable pre-
diction"' 6 rather than "rough guesses" or "approximation"'1 and
that there must be a standard "fixed in fact and capable of being
stated in definite terms of money."'- The first class of standards
held to be ascertainable are those where the trustee's power of in-
vasion is limited to the amount necessary to insure that the lifetime
beneficiary will continue to live according to his or her accustomed
standard of living.'9 Other language held to connote the objective
station in life standard includes "support, maintenance, welfare,
and comfort,"20 "comfort and support,"21 "comfort and welfare, '22
"' Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595,
599 (1949).
' Young Mens Christian Ass'n v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924).
" Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256, 262 (1943).lId. at 261.
18 Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 154 (1929).
''Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929); Lincoln
Rochester Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 181, F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1950);
Estate of Leonard 0. Carlson, 21 T.C. 291 (1953).
"0 Estate of Mary C. Wood, 39 T.C. 919 (1963).
"Estate of Edwin E. Jack, 6 T.C. 241 (1946).
" Blodget v. Delaney, 201 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1953).
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"care and maintenance," 3 and "comfortable maintenance and sup-
port."24  The objective standard has also been implied where the
invasion was limited to periods created by physical or economic
emergencies. 5
Where there is subjective language such as "use and benefit,"26
"comfortable support and maintenance and for any other reasonable
requirements, 2 7 "need or desire,"2 "support, maintenance, and
comfort, including luxuries," 29 and "welfare, comfort, and hap-
piness,"3 the courts have been prone to say that the standard is
unascertainable. Expansive language directing the trustee to in-
vade the corpus for the proper maintenance and support of the
beneficiary to the same generous extent that the testator, if living,
could do has caused an otherwise objective standard to fail for
subjectivity.3' Directions by the testator to the effect that the
trustee in exercising his discretion is to favor the private beneficiary
over the charity have also rendered the remainder nondeductible.32
"' Estate of Nellie H. Jennings, 10 T.C. 241 (1946).
*' Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Eaton, 36 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1929).
Payment by the trustee was to be limited to cases of need "on account
of any sickness, accident, want, or other emergency," Commissioner v. Wells
Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 145 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1944); "in case
she should, by reason of accident, illness, or other unusual circumstances so
require," Commissioner v. Bank of America Trust & Savings Ass'n, 133
F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1943); "in case of illness or other emergency" affecting
the beneficiary or his family, Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. United
States, 265 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1967); and for any "emergency, illness,
or necessity," Estate of Oliver Lee, 28 T.C. 1259 (1957).
" Newton Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1947).
"! State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 313 F.2d 29 (1st Cir.
1963).
" Gammons v. Hassett, 121 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 673 (1941).
° Vaccaro v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 307 (D. Mass. 1963).United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962).
Kline v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. W.Va. 1962), aff'd
per curiamn, 313 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1963). Directions to the trustee to make
payments "for any other purpose which my trustee shall deem expedient,
necessary, or desirable for the benefit and use of my sister," Zentmayer v.
Commissioner, 336 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1964); "for any purpose which may
add to her (beneficiary's) comfort or convenience," Seubert v. Shaughnessy,
233 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1956) ; and "of such portion of the trust as my sister
may in writing request" with her judgement as to need being conclusive,
Merrill Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 474 (D. Me. 1958), have
rendered an otherwise objective standard subjective.
" Typical examples are directions that the trustee's first object to be
accomplished is to provide for the beneficiary in "such manner as she may
desire," Ilenslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595(1949) ; that in the exercise of his discretion he is to be liberal to the life
time beneficiary, Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256
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Furthermore the use of subjective or expansive language in con-
junction with a limitation permitting invasion only in cases of
emergency have caused the standard to be unascertainable.8" It
seems though that in this latter situation the courts will more readily
imply an objective standard. 4
In the construction and interpretation of a will the primary pur-
pose of the court is to ascertain the intention of the testator. 5 To
do this the courts must necessarily interpret the will in accordance
with the applicable state law since it is that law which ultimately
determines the extent of the trustee's power of invasion. 8  This
dependence upon state law in determining the existence of a stan-
dard creates what at first appears to be an inconsistency between
the courts' words and actions. The federal courts have consistently
refused to consider outside circumstances in order to make the stan-
dard ascertainable. 37 Yet we find that the state courts construe the
language used by the testator in the light of such outside circum-
stances as the condition of the testator's family, how he was cir-
cumstanced, his relationship to the beneficiary, the financial condi-
tion of the beneficiary (at least where it was known to the testator),
and even the motives which are reasonably supposed to influence
him.3" Thus, in a sense, extrinsic circumstances sometimes in-
(1943) ; that he is to give "sympathetic consideration to any request" made
by the beneficiary, Union Trust Co. v. Tomlinson, 355 F.2d 40 (5th Cir.
1966); and that his powers are to be liberally construed in favor of the
private beneficiary, Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 592
(1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 788 (1946).
" In DeCastro v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 254, (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 727 (1946), the court held that a provision allowing in-
vasion if other income did not "amply" provide for the life beneficiary's needs
rendered the remainder nondeductible. A similar result was reached in
Estate of Helen H. Thompson, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Rep. & Mem. Dec. 1 58-100
(1958), where the trustee was directed to make payments "for the best
interest of the beneficiary during illness or emergency of any kind."
" Compare Salisbury v. United States, 378 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1967) and
Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 800 (D.
Conn. 1967), with Newton Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 175 (1st
Cir. 1947).
" Salisbury v. United States, 378 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1967).
" Blodget v. Delany, 201 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1953).
" Seubert v. Shaughnessy, 233 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1956). The court in-
dicated that extrinsic facts such as the financial condition of the life
beneficiary were irrelevant to the question of whether or not there was an
ascertainable standard.
" Rufty v. Brantly, 204 Ark. 32, 161 S.W.2d 11 (1942) ; Stern v. Stern,
410 Ill. 377, 102 N.E.2d 104 (1951); Herring v. Williams, 153 N.C. 231,
69 S.E. 140 (1910); It re Jackson's Estate, 377 Pa. 561, 12 A.2d 338
(1940); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 129 S.C. 321, 123 S.E. 854 (1924).
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directly enter into the determination of an "ascertainable stan-
dard." 9  Despite the apparent inconsistency there is a distinction
that can be drawn between these two practices. In the latter instance
the courts are using the outside factors to determine the testator's
intent expressed in the language of the will. In the former if the
court finds that the language is subjective it will not allow the de-
duction just because those same factors show that the likelihood of
invasion is remote.
What is "so remote as to be negligible?" Must the taxpayer
prove that it is impossible for charity not to take? This question
was answered in the negative by the court in Hamilton National
Bank v. United States.40 The court made it clear that a charitable
deduction will be allowed even though some uncertainty exists.
In defining "so remote as to be negligible" the court said "a negligi-
ble possibility is a possibility that would in the ordinary and reason-
able affairs of men be disregarded in arriving at a present valuation
of a future remainder interest in a serious business transaction, with
no deduction in the value of the remainder interest being made by
reason of the existence of such a possibility."41  Whether such a
possibility exists is a question of fact. No general rules or con-
clusions can be reached as each case must necessarily be decided
on its own particular facts.
What facts are to be considered? The courts have stated that
only those facts existing at the testator's death are relevant.4 2  In
" Where there has been a state court decision which is neither collusive
nor inoperative, on the extent of the trustee's power of invasion, it seems
that the federal courts in applying the federal tax statute must make their
determination in accordance with the state court ruling. Henrickson v.
Baker-Boyer Nat'l Bank, 139 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1944). Professors Lowndes
and Kramer point out that where there is no state court decision on the
particular trust under consideration the federal courts generally construe and
apply the state law for themselves. C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES, 57 (2d ed. 1962). In construing the will the
federal courts must necessarily take into account all the factors which
are relevant in the particular state jurisdiction to the interpretation of a
will. To do otherwise would be unrealistic as no accurate interpretation
of the language used could be made. Furthermore, if the outside factors
were completely ignored a tax might often be imposed on interests which
by State Law were certain to go to charity.
40236 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Tenn. 1965), aff'd, 367 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.
1966).
"'236 F. Supp. 1005, 1016 (E.D. Tenn. 1965), aff'd, 367 F.2d 554 (6th
Cir. 1966).
" Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929); Lincoln
Rochester Trust Co. v. McGowan, 217 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1954).
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Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. McGowan the court said that "actual
events occurring after the testator's death may never be substituted
for the estimate of probable events made as of the time of the
testator's death and based upon circumstances as they existed on that
date."43  For later events to be considered their admission must
"have sufficiently high probative value in establishing or clarifying
the circumstances as they existed at the time of the testator's
death."'4
4
In Allen v. First National Bank45 property was left by the testa-
tor to his wife for life and then to the children (including those
born posthumously) and descendants that survive her. In the event
there were no survivors the property was to go to designated chari-
ties. In allowing a deduction the court had to decide whether or
not it was proper to admit evidence of the fact that no child had
been born posthumously. In admitting the evidence the court said
that it was merely evidence establishing the existence of a state of
facts which existed at the date of the testator's death. The evi-
dence tended to establish that as of the date of death there would
not and could not be any child born of the marriage. Later events
held inadmissible included an actual invasion of the corpus after
the date of death and evidence of the later death of the private
beneficiary.47 The distinction is, as the above court pointed out,
that evidence of this nature has no connection at all with the facts
existing at the time of the testator's death.
The factors which seem to weigh most heavily with the courts
are the life expectancy of the beneficiary, the beneficiary's past stan-
dard of living, the income of the trust, and the independent means
of the beneficiary available for the payment of such expenses.4 8 In
their consideration of this last factor another important question
must be answered by the court: does the applicable state law re-
quire that the lifetime beneficiary substantially exhaust his own
"217 F.2d 287, 293 (2d Cir. 1954).
"Id.
"169 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1948).
Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 132
(9th Cir. 1944). The court said that it was improper to be influenced by
such evidence.
"Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 559
(1949); Merrill Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 474 (D. Me.
1958).
"E state of Eunice M. Greene, 11 T.C. 205 (1948); Estate of John W.
Holmes, 5 T.C. 1289 (1945).
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private resources before an invasion can be made? In Christy v.
Commissioner49 a deduction was not allowed principally because
Pennsylvania had no such requirement. Had this case arisen in
another jurisdiction the deduction probably would have been
allowed."0 Some other factors considered by the courts include the
beneficiary's ability to work, the probability that he will continue
to work, the number of his dependants, the state of the beneficiary's
health, and the character of the trustee.51
In reviewing the decisions of the courts in this area it is evident
that much confusion exists. But from these cases several general
propositions can be deduced. First, the power of invasion should
be limited to that amount necessary to maintain the beneficiary ac-
cording to his prior station in life. Secondly, subjective or expan-
sive language should not be used to limit the power of invasion as
it seems to be an invitation to a law suit. Furthermore most chari-
table interests have been held nondeductible where this language
was used. Thirdly, if tax considerations are the prime concern, a
provision to the effect that the beneficiary must exhaust his assets
before an invasion can be made should be included in the testator's
will if the applicable state law has no such requirement. Lastly,
the testator should not rely upon getting a partial deduction. If a
trust has been established and it later appears that a deduction will
be denied consideration should be given to disclaiming the power
of invasion.
5 2
JOHN M. MASSEY
'°8 T.C. 862 (1947).
"Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 800
(D. Conn. 1967). In Connecticut the invasion of the corpus is conditioned
upon the exhaustion of the beneficiary's assets.
"'Estate of Mary C. Wood, 39 T.C. 919 (1963); Estate of Lucius H.
Elmer, 6 T.C. 944 (1946); Estate of Charles H. Wiggins, 3 T.C. 464
(1944); Union Nat'1 Bank v. Looker, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,258 (N.D.
W.Va. 1964).
" INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 2055. This section provides that included
in the amount deductible is the value of all the interest which passes to
charity as the result of an irrevocable disclaimer. For a deduction to be
taken the disclaimer must be filed in the probate court before the estate
tax return is filed.
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